Institutionalisation of Stablecoins: Evolution, Structure and Regulatory Divergence Across Three Jurisdictions | 稳定币的制度化进程：发展、结构与三国监管分野
Independent research on structural shifts in energy, technology, and capital.
聚焦能源、技术与资本结构性变化的独立研究。
For informational purposes only. Not investment advice.
仅供信息参考，不应被视为投资建议。
Introduction | 引言
In less than a decade, stablecoins have evolved from niche settlement instruments within cryptoasset markets into instruments settling trillions of dollars annually on-chain. What began as a technical response to trading frictions is now embedded in debates about dollar primacy, cross-border payments, central bank digital currencies and monetary sovereignty. However, on-chain transfer volume should not be equated with identifiable cross-border consumer payments: widely cited 2025 figures measure blockchain transfer activity, only part of which corresponds to clearly attributable payment use cases.
在不到十年的时间里，稳定币已从加密资产市场中的小众结算工具，演变为每年在链上结算数万亿美元规模的金融工具。一个原本用于缓解交易摩擦的技术安排，如今已被纳入关于美元主导地位、跨境支付、央行数字货币与货币主权的讨论之中。不过，链上转账规模并不等同于可识别的跨境零售支付规模：2025 年常被引用的数据衡量的是区块链转账活动，其中只有一部分可以明确归因为支付用途。
The central question is therefore not whether stablecoins are innovative, but whether they mark a structural shift in the architecture of money. Are they merely crypto-native liquidity instruments, or are they becoming parallel settlement rails operating alongside the traditional dollar-based financial system? That question matters more today because regulators in major jurisdictions have moved from observing stablecoins at the margin to designing dedicated legal frameworks for them.
因此，真正的核心问题并不在于稳定币是否具有创新性，而在于它们是否标志着货币体系结构的变化。它们究竟只是加密生态内部的流动性工具，还是正在形成一套与传统美元金融体系并行运作的结算轨道？这一问题在当前尤其重要，因为主要司法辖区的监管者已不再只是边缘观察稳定币，而是开始为其设计专门的法律框架。
The implications are not confined to technology or markets. If stablecoins function as digital representations of sovereign currencies, they necessarily intersect with monetary transmission, capital mobility and financial regulation. In that sense, the debate surrounding stablecoins remains closely connected to the classic monetary trilemma: full monetary sovereignty, free capital mobility and exchange-rate stability cannot be maximised simultaneously.
这一问题的影响已不限于技术或市场层面。如果稳定币作为主权货币的数字映射存在，它们必然触及货币政策传导、资本流动与金融监管等核心议题。从这个意义上说，围绕稳定币的讨论仍与经典的“货币不可能三角”密切相关：完全的货币主权、资本自由流动与汇率稳定无法同时最大化实现。
Against this backdrop, the present article approaches stablecoins not as speculative assets, but as components within an evolving monetary infrastructure. By examining their distinction from cryptoassets, peg structures, historical development, 2025 scale, interaction with the dollar system, SWIFT and CBDCs, and regulatory responses in the United States, Singapore and Mainland China, the analysis places stablecoins within a broader macro-institutional framework.
基于上述背景，本文并不将稳定币视为投机资产，而是将其置于货币基础设施演进的框架中分析。文章将从其与加密资产的区别、锚定结构、发展脉络、2025 年规模、与美元体系、SWIFT 及央行数字货币的互动关系，以及美国、新加坡与中国大陆的监管回应等方面出发，将稳定币置于更宏观的制度分析框架之中。
I. Stablecoins versus Cryptoassets: Functional and Structural Distinctions
稳定币与加密资产的区别：功能与结构差异
Stablecoins differ fundamentally from cryptoassets such as Bitcoin or Ether. Bitcoin and similar cryptoassets are volatility-bearing digital commodities or network-native assets whose price formation reflects supply constraints, market demand and speculative expectations. Stability is not their design objective. By contrast, stablecoins are designed to maintain a reference value, typically against sovereign currency, and are used primarily for settlement, pricing and collateral management rather than capital appreciation.
稳定币与比特币、以太币等加密资产在本质上存在区别。比特币等加密资产通常被视为具有价格波动性的数字商品或网络原生资产，其价格形成反映供给约束、市场需求与投机预期，稳定性并非其设计目标。相比之下，稳定币的设计目的是维持参考价值，通常锚定主权货币，其主要用途是结算、计价与抵押管理，而非资本升值。
Accordingly, the principal risk profile differs. Cryptoassets are primarily exposed to market volatility risk, whereas stablecoins are primarily exposed to structural risks associated with reserve quality, custody arrangements, redemption enforceability, governance design, and, in some models, collateral and hedging mechanics.
因此，两者的主要风险结构并不相同。加密资产主要面临市场波动风险，而稳定币主要面临储备质量、托管安排、赎回机制可执行性、治理结构，以及在某些模型下的抵押与对冲机制等结构性风险。
II. Peg Structures and Risk Typologies
锚定结构与风险类型
Fiat-backed stablecoins rely on reserve assets such as cash and short-dated government securities to maintain a one-to-one peg. This remains the dominant model by market capitalisation. Its strengths lie in redemption clarity and accounting simplicity, while its core vulnerabilities concern reserve composition, custody, maturity mismatch and regulatory compliance.
法币储备型稳定币依赖现金及短期政府债券等储备资产来维持一比一锚定。这仍然是按市值计算的主导模式。其优势在于赎回逻辑清晰、会计结构相对简单，而核心脆弱点在于储备构成、托管安排、期限错配以及监管合规。
Crypto-collateralised models depend on over-collateralisation in digital assets. Their stability mechanism is endogenous to on-chain collateral values and liquidation design. This gives them greater programmability, but also makes them vulnerable to collateral price shocks and liquidation cascades.
加密资产抵押型模式依赖数字资产的超额抵押。其稳定机制内生于链上抵押品价值与清算机制设计。这赋予其更强的可编程性，但也使其更容易受到抵押品价格冲击与连锁清算的影响。
Algorithmic or synthetic structures rely on incentive systems, hedging arrangements or synthetic replication rather than conventional reserve accounts. The market experience of recent years has shown that these models can scale rapidly in benign conditions but may prove fragile under stress, particularly when confidence in the stabilisation mechanism deteriorates. The rise and subsequent deleveraging episodes of synthetic-dollar designs in 2025 reinforced that point.
算法型或合成型结构依赖激励机制、对冲安排或合成复制，而非传统储备账户。近年的市场经验表明，这类模式在环境平稳时可能快速扩张，但在压力情境下往往较为脆弱，尤其当市场对其稳定机制的信心下降时更是如此。2025 年合成美元设计的扩张与随后去杠杆化过程进一步强化了这一点。
Commodity-backed stablecoins are supported by physical assets such as gold and involve custody, audit and legal-claim risks rather than conventional bank-reserve risks.
商品支持型稳定币以黄金等实物资产为支撑，其主要风险更偏向托管、审计与法律权利确认，而非传统银行储备风险。
III. Evolution: From Exchange Instrument to Settlement Infrastructure
发展路径：从交易工具到结算基础设施
In their early phase, roughly from 2014 to 2018, stablecoins such as USDT served primarily as internal dollar substitutes on crypto exchanges. Their function was narrow: to provide a dollar-like settlement asset for market participants that lacked direct fiat access.
在早期阶段，大致从 2014 年到 2018 年，以 USDT 为代表的稳定币主要作为加密交易所内部的美元替代工具而存在。其功能较为单一，即为缺乏直接法币通道的市场参与者提供一种类似美元的结算资产。
Between 2019 and 2021, the rise of decentralised finance positioned stablecoins as foundational collateral and units of account in lending, derivatives and liquidity protocols. They ceased to be merely exchange instruments and became the monetary base of a broader on-chain financial ecosystem.
2019 至 2021 年，去中心化金融的兴起使稳定币成为借贷、衍生品与流动性协议中的基础抵押品和计价单位。它们不再只是交易所工具，而逐步成为更广泛链上金融生态中的“货币底座”。
After the stress events of 2022, market participants and policymakers increasingly prioritised reserve transparency, redemption mechanisms and regulatory alignment. By 2025–2026, the direction of travel was no longer merely towards greater transparency but towards incorporation into regulated payment and settlement infrastructures, including B2B payment and treasury management use cases.
2022 年市场压力事件之后，市场参与者与监管机构愈发重视储备透明度、赎回机制与监管协调。到 2025–2026 年，行业的发展方向已不仅是提高透明度，而是逐步被纳入受监管的支付与结算基础设施之中，包括企业间支付与资金管理等场景。
IV. Global Scale in 2025
2025 年全球规模
According to CoinGecko’s 2025 Annual Crypto Report, total stablecoin market capitalisation reached approximately USD 311 billion by the end of 2025.
根据 CoinGecko《2025 年加密市场年度报告》，稳定币总市值在 2025 年末约为 3110 亿美元。
The a16z State of Crypto 2025 report estimated annual on-chain stablecoin transaction volume at around USD 46 trillion on an unadjusted basis and approximately USD 9 trillion on an adjusted basis. Those figures are useful for understanding scale, but they should be read as measures of blockchain transfer activity rather than as direct equivalents of consumer or cross-border payment volume.
a16z《State of Crypto 2025》报告估计，2025 年稳定币年度链上交易额约为 46 万亿美元（未调整口径），经调整后约为 9 万亿美元。这些数字有助于理解规模，但应被理解为区块链转账活动的衡量口径，而非消费者支付或跨境支付规模的直接对应。
At this scale, stablecoins are no longer peripheral instruments. They represent a meaningful extension of dollar-denominated liquidity into programmable digital environments, even if their precise economic use varies substantially by activity type.
在这一规模下，稳定币已不再是边缘性工具。即便其经济用途会因活动类型不同而显著差异，它们仍然构成了美元计价流动性向可编程数字环境延伸的重要载体。
V. Competitive Landscape: Dollar System, SWIFT and CBDCs
竞争格局：美元体系、SWIFT 与央行数字货币
Most major stablecoins remain denominated in U.S. dollars. As a result, stablecoins tend to reinforce rather than weaken dollar pricing and liquidity network effects in digital markets. In practice, they have functioned less as anti-dollar instruments than as privately issued extensions of digital dollar liquidity.
多数主要稳定币仍以美元计价。因此，稳定币在数字市场中通常强化而非削弱美元的计价与流动性网络效应。就实际运行而言，它们与其说是“反美元”工具，不如说是由私人主体发行的数字美元流动性延伸。
SWIFT remains the dominant global interbank messaging system. Stablecoins do not displace sovereign clearing structures, but they may bypass specific layers of traditional settlement chains in certain contexts, especially where settlement speed, programmability or 24-hour transferability are valuable.
SWIFT 仍是全球银行间消息传输体系的核心。稳定币并未取代主权清算结构，但在某些特定场景下，尤其是当结算速度、可编程性或全天候转移能力具有价值时，它们可能绕过传统结算链条中的部分环节。
Central bank digital currencies represent sovereign responses to digital monetary issuance. The interaction between CBDCs and stablecoins reflects structural negotiation between public authority and private innovation rather than deterministic substitution. In many jurisdictions, the emerging policy question is not “CBDCs or stablecoins”, but which functions should remain sovereign and which may be delegated to supervised private issuers.
央行数字货币代表主权国家对数字货币发行的回应。CBDC 与稳定币之间的互动体现的是公共权威与私人创新之间的结构性博弈，而非确定性的替代关系。在许多司法辖区，正在形成的政策问题并不是“CBDC 还是稳定币”，而是哪些功能应保留为主权职责，哪些功能可以交由受监管的私人发行方承担。
VI. Comparative Regulatory Approaches
三国监管路径比较
The United States: Integrating Stablecoins into a Payments and Financial-Stability Framework
美国：将稳定币纳入“支付与金融稳定”框架
The United States has now moved beyond regulatory ambiguity and enacted a dedicated federal framework through the GENIUS Act. The legislation establishes a legal framework for payment stablecoins and addresses issuer requirements, reserve standards, redemption, supervision and compliance obligations.
美国现已超越此前的监管模糊状态，通过 GENIUS Act 建立了专门的联邦框架。该立法为支付型稳定币设立法律框架，并涵盖发行人要求、储备标准、赎回、监管与合规义务。
This approach indicates that the United States does not treat stablecoins merely as securities or illicit instruments. Instead, it seeks to institutionalise them as regulated payment tools. The regulatory logic emphasises highly liquid reserve assets, enforceable redemption rights and issuer activity within a defined supervisory perimeter.
这一制度路径表明，美国并未将稳定币仅视为证券或非法工具，而是试图将其制度化为受监管的支付工具。其监管逻辑强调高流动性储备资产、可执行的赎回权，以及发行人活动必须纳入明确的监管边界。
In substance, the U.S. approach reflects an effort to preserve dollar primacy while bringing stablecoins into the existing financial regulatory architecture rather than excluding them. However, enactment should not be conflated with immediate operational finality: the practical effects of the framework still depend on implementing rules and supervisory interpretation.
从实质上看，美国的制度路径体现为：在维持美元主导地位的同时，将稳定币纳入既有金融监管架构，而非将其排除在外。不过，法律通过并不等于所有操作细节已即时最终落地：这一框架的实际效果仍取决于后续实施规则与监管解释。
Singapore: Technology-Neutral and Risk-Focused Supervision
新加坡：技术中立与风险导向的稳定币监管
The Monetary Authority of Singapore finalised its stablecoin regulatory framework in 2023. The official framework applies to single-currency stablecoins issued in Singapore and pegged to the Singapore dollar or any G10 currency. It covers reserve composition, valuation, custody and audit requirements.
新加坡金融管理局于 2023 年最终确定其稳定币监管框架。该官方框架适用于在新加坡发行、锚定新元或任何 G10 货币的单币种稳定币，并涵盖储备构成、估值、托管及审计要求。
Singapore’s regulatory philosophy is characterised by technological neutrality. Tokenisation does not alter the legal nature of the relevant financial arrangement; the decisive issue is whether the associated risks are identifiable, supervisable and containable. Stablecoins are therefore permitted, but only within a prudential perimeter.
新加坡监管立场的核心特征在于技术中立。代币化并不改变相关金融安排的法律属性，关键在于其风险是否可识别、可监管、可控制。因此，稳定币在新加坡并非被一概禁止，而是在审慎监管边界内被允许存在。
The scope of the framework is deliberately narrow. It does not amount to a universal licensing regime for all stablecoins; rather, it defines a specific regulated category of single-currency stablecoins within a broader digital-asset landscape.
这一框架的适用范围被有意限定。它并不构成对所有稳定币的普遍许可制度，而是在更广泛的数字资产领域中，界定出一类特定的、受监管的单币种稳定币。
Mainland China: Risk Containment and Monetary Sovereignty as Primary Objectives
中国大陆：坚持风险处置与货币主权优先
On 6 February 2026, the People’s Bank of China, together with the China Securities Regulatory Commission and six other authorities, issued a revised notice on preventing and disposing of risks related to virtual currencies and related activities. The notice states that Bitcoin, Ether and stablecoins such as Tether do not have the same legal status as legal tender. It further provides that domestic virtual-currency-related activities constitute illegal financial activities and are strictly prohibited.
2026 年 2 月 6 日，中国人民银行会同中国证监会等八部门发布了修订后的关于防范和处置虚拟货币等相关风险的通知。该通知明确指出，比特币、以太币以及泰达币等稳定币不具有与法定货币等同的法律地位，并进一步规定，在境内开展虚拟货币相关业务活动属于非法金融活动，应当严格禁止。
With regard to stablecoins, the notice specifically provides that, without approval in accordance with laws and regulations, no domestic or overseas entity or individual may issue RMB-pegged stablecoins overseas. It also places real-world asset tokenisation within the broader risk-disposal framework, noting that certain onshore tokenisation activities may constitute illegal token issuance, unauthorised securities offering or illegal fundraising.
就稳定币而言，该通知特别规定，未经依法依规批准，境内外任何单位和个人不得在境外发行挂钩人民币的稳定币。通知还将现实世界资产代币化纳入更广泛的风险处置框架，并指出某些境内代币化活动可能构成非法发售代币票券、擅自公开发行证券或非法集资。
At the same time, a same-day CSRC regulatory release concerning certain offshore issuances of tokenised asset-backed securities indicates that the policy line is not one of undifferentiated prohibition. Rather, it draws a sharp distinction between prohibited virtual-currency activity and tightly approved securities-tokenisation activity conducted through designated infrastructures and regulatory channels.
但与此同时，证监会同日发布的关于特定境内资产境外发行资产支持证券代币的监管文件也表明，中国的政策并非对一切代币化一概禁止，而是在“被禁止的虚拟货币活动”与“通过指定基础设施和监管通道、被严格批准的证券型代币化活动”之间作出清晰区分。
China’s regulatory logic, therefore, reveals a clear hierarchy of priorities: first, safeguarding monetary sovereignty; second, preventing systemic financial risk; and third, maintaining strict control over cross-border virtual-asset activity.
因此，中国的监管逻辑呈现出清晰的优先序：第一，维护货币主权；第二，防范系统性金融风险；第三，对跨境虚拟资产活动保持严格控制。
Conclusion｜结语
Stablecoins must be understood within the framework of the classical monetary trilemma: no jurisdiction can simultaneously preserve full monetary sovereignty, free capital mobility and exchange-rate stability.
稳定币应当放在经典“货币不可能三角”的框架下理解：任何司法辖区都无法同时实现完全的货币主权、资本自由流动与汇率稳定。
Dollar-pegged stablecoins introduce digitally transferable liquidity that reconfigures traditional capital boundaries while remaining anchored to sovereign currency units. They are not simply technical tokens, but institutional instruments whose meaning depends on the legal and monetary system into which they are embedded.
锚定美元的稳定币在保持与主权货币单位关联的同时，引入了可数字化转移的流动性，并重塑传统资本边界。它们并非只是技术性代币，而是其意义取决于所嵌入的法律与货币制度环境的制度性工具。
The United States seeks institutional integration, Singapore emphasises regulated openness, and Mainland China prioritises sovereignty and risk containment. The future of stablecoins will depend not solely on technology, but on how states recalibrate the monetary trilemma in a digitally interconnected financial system.
美国选择制度整合，新加坡强调受监管的开放，中国大陆则优先维护主权与风险防控。稳定币的未来不仅取决于技术本身，更取决于各国如何在数字互联的金融体系中重新平衡这一货币不可能三角。
References
CoinGecko, 2025 Annual Crypto Report.
a16z crypto, State of Crypto 2025.
Congress.gov / related legal analyses on the GENIUS Act and implementation.
Monetary Authority of Singapore, MAS Finalises Stablecoin Regulatory Framework and related materials.
中国证监会、中国人民银行等，2026 年 2 月 6 日相关通知与监管文件。
BIS and related policy materials on CBDCs and monetary structure.
Additional source materials on stablecoin structure, synthetic-dollar models, payments and settlement use cases.